W ho can divine the intentions of the human heart, the mo tives that guide behavior? Some of the reasons for our actions lie on the surface of consciousness, whereas others are more deeply embedded in the recesses of the mind. Recovering motives and intentions is a principal job of the historian. For without some attribution of mental attitudes, actions cannot be characterized and decisions assessed. The same overt behavior, after all, might be described as "mailing a letter" or "fomenting a revolution." The recovery of intentions is crucial for the historian's narrative.
In the case of Charles Darwin, per haps the most important question is, What led him to formulate his theory of the modification and common de scent of species? Scholars have settled more or less securely on the answer, ar guing that since he was quite aware of the transmutational views of his grand father, Erasmus Darwin, and those of JeanBaptiste Lamarck, Darwin would have had his eyes opened to the vari ability of species on his fiveyear Beagle voyage. After he returned to England in 1836, he consulted with John Gould, or nithologist at the British Museum, about three types of Galápagos mockingbirds. They were not, as the young natural ist had initially assumed, varieties of a single species that had adapted to local environments but true and good species. Frank Sulloway, some years ago, con vinced most of the scholarly community that Darwin's experience with Gould ignited a mind packed with possibility. Thereafter, wouldn't sheer scientific am bition, the excitement of getting to the bottom of things, have pushed Darwin along during the 20 years of the theory's gestation? Wouldn't he have been mo tivated by the same kind of desire for adventure and recognition that led him to depart England in the first place? It has been generally assumed that posi tive answers to these questions would account for Darwin's parting company with English scientific orthodoxy. Desmond and Moore distribute these contextual discussions more or less in tandem with an account of the development of Darwin's theory, the weight of context pushes the details of the theory far to the sidelines-in deed, so far that evidence for com mon descent in the form of Darwin's Galápagos mockingbirds is shoved right off the page.
In order for me to come to a con clusion other than the one I originally reached, three questions would need to be satisfactorily answered. First, did Darwin formulate his theory of common descent in order to op pose slavery, as the authors maintain, or did he do so for the reasons that scholars have generally proposed? Of course, he may have had more than one motivation, but then some weighting of motives would be re quired. Second, would Darwin's theory of common descent ground abolitionists' efforts by expressing the brotherly equal ity of the races, or would it leave intact the general 19thcentury assumption of the inferiority of the "savage" races? Fi nally, regardless of original motivation, did Darwin believe a theory of common descent would provide a scientific argu ment against the "peculiar institution," or did he act as though the issue of slav ery was unconnected to his theory?
The first question goes to the heart of the authors' thesis, and a firm an swer along the lines they suggest would make theirs truly a revolutionary work in history of science. Their most detailed and precisely formulated argument maintains that Darwin believed that the human races formed a brotherhood and that this belief served as model and jus tification for common descent.
Like siblings they [the human rac es] shared a common parentage: the races were united by blood. The metaphor Darwin visualized near the beginning of his evolution ary journey was of a genealogical "tree": many branches meeting in the past in a joint ancestor.
. . . His heresy was to extend human racial relationships to all the branches of creation, and to push the trunk deep into the geo logical soil.
The first quotation that they cite sug gesting a comparability between a hu man pedigree and the general descent of all organisms comes in an entry in Darwin's Notebook C for May 1838:
My theory explains that family likeness [in animals], which as in absolute human family is un describable, yet holds good, so does it in real classification . . . I cannot help thinking good analogy might be traced between relationship of all men now living & the classifi cation of animals.
On the page facing this quotation the authors reproduce the famous, angular treelike diagram (left) from Darwin's B Notebook, which he sketched in July 1837. Their caption states that it is no surprise that Dar win "used the human genealogical image to model the 'common de scent' of all life."
The problems with their argument are multiple. First, the entry from May 1838 came well over a year af ter Darwin first considered descent in his notebooks and eight months after he drew the diagram of July 1837. Second, that abstract diagram has no associated entries mentioning human pedigrees (despite the urg ing of the authors' caption), nor is it the first branching diagram in the notebooks-two earlier ones specifi cally sketch the possible branching of fish and birds, also without any mention of human pedigrees. Third, the analogy with the "relationship of all men" appears to be made after his assertion of descent, or at least Darwin's wording so suggests. Fi nally, the July diagram is quite like ly based on a very similar angular branching diagram constructed by Martin Barry, which that naturalist labeled "The Tree of Animal De velopment." Barry's diagram (re produced on page 415) was meant to illustrate Karl Ernst von Baer's theory of relationships among ani mal archetypes; it appeared in a journal that Darwin read a short time before he sketched his July diagram. Of course, in his initial conception of branching descent, Darwin may nevertheless have been explicitly modeling it on human pedigrees, but there is no direct evi dence for this. And even if we had such evidence, it would not obviously imply that the human model was somehow meant as a defense against slavery. As the authors themselves point out, many Christian proponents of slavery recog nized Adam and Eve as giving rise to the races of mankind. Common descent, in this latter instance, was obviously no compelling argument against slavery.
When Desmond and Moore broach the question of what Darwin's attitude was toward the hierarchy of races, they admit that in The Descent of Man (1871) Darwin did not hesitate to predict that the "higher" races will, in the course of time, exterminate the "lower" races. They suggest that Darwin assumed a human racial hierarchy principally Men (1850) . Perhaps, it might be thought, these books failed to impress Darwin because they asserted the exis tence of many distinct species of human beings, whereas Darwin supposed the races to be but varieties of a common species. But Darwin himself argued, both in the Origin of Species (1859) and the Descent, that there was no essential difference between varieties (or races) and species; hence it was a matter of convention that we typically referred to human races rather than human species. Indeed, Darwin penciled on the back flyleaf of his copy of Morton's Types of Mankind: "As a mere naturalist . . . I shd look at races of man as deserving to be called distinct species, yet I con sider as descended from common stock so come back at common belief" [i.e., talk of "human races"]. But perhaps the more important problem is to determine what views Darwin held about inferior ity early in his theorizing, since he may have wavered only in his later years.
The authors quite forthrightly men tion that about a month after he read Thomas Robert Malthus (on September 28, 1838), Darwin applied the notion of struggle to human beings and suggest ed that superior intellect would give the advantage to whites in Australia. Darwin's reflection is hardly consis tent with a supposed nonhierarchical conception of the races. The authors gloss this notebook passage by saying, "His science was becoming emotion ally confused and ideologically messy." Aside from a tortured effort to save ap pearances, they seem to concede that Darwin made hierarchical assumptions virtually at the outset of work on his theory, not merely in the 1860s. And even before the Malthus episode, there are notebook entries that suggest as sumptions of racial hierarchy-for example, when Darwin compares the superior mental organization of Ameri can Indians to that of black Africans (M Notebook, pages 8587). From the beginning, Darwin thought "my theory requires progression" (E Notebook, page 60); but a progressivist view implies recognition of hierarchies of "higher" and "lower" races and species.
Desmond and Moore have, with great thoroughness, displayed the variety of ideological and scientific positions on slavery during the first half of the 19th century. Many Christian Americans in the South could proclaim common de scent of all races from a single pair and yet regard some of those races as infe rior and requiring the civilizing hand of slavery. Other people, such as Robert Knox and Louis Agassiz, might reject the Biblical story and consider the races as separate, hierarchical creations, and yet detest slavery. Huxley also opposed slav ery, but not because of human unity-he thought blacks inferior-but because it degraded whites. Thus as Darwin was formulating his theory, he had no a priori reason to believe that a hypoth esis of common descent would serve as a scientific defense against slavery, espe cially if one's particular version of com mon descent supposed a hierarchy of races, as Darwin's surely did. The resolu tion to the first two questions I put does not, I believe, sustain the authors' general thesis. Nonetheless, although Darwin had no logical reason to suppose that his theory gave support to the abolitionist movement, this would not have preclud ed him from believing that it did.
The authors, however, have laid out no explicit evidence that Darwin sup posed his theory might subvert slav ery. And the indirect lines of argument seem to me unavailing. Yet, and here is my final question, does the rich and varied context they construct-the thicket of thencontemporary literature about slavery; the family's abolitionist traditions; Darwin's interactions with individuals such as Lyell, who waffled on the slavery issue; his many abjura tions of the peculiar institution-does all of this suggest a connection with his conception of common descent? The authors brilliantly contrive to sug gest that it does. But that remains, I believe, only a suggestion. In passing, the authors do mention a reason for Darwin's detestation of slavery that needed no buttressing from a scientific theory: It was simply that he thought the institution unmitigatedly cruel. The answer as to whether this was the whole of the matter lies still hid den in the secret chambers of the great scientist's heart. Desmond and Moore have, nonetheless, produced a book of deep scholarship, which considerably expands our appreciation of Darwin's accomplishment. M odern mathematics-in the sense the term is used by working mathematicians these days-took shape in the period from 1890 to 1930, mainly in Germany and France. Strikingly new concepts were introduced, new methods were employed, and whole new areas of specialization emerged, while other themes were relegated to the dusty shelves of history. At the same time, the nature of mathematical truth and even the consistency of mathematics were put into question, as mathematicians, logicians and philosophers grappled with the subject's very foundations.
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